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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
While  there  is increasing  evidence  that  graded  return-to-work  is an  effective  tool  for  the  rehabilitation  of
sick-listed  workers,  little is  known  on the  optimal  timing  and  level  of  grading  in  return-to-work  trajec-
tories.  We  use administrative  data  from  a  Dutch  private  workplace  reintegration  provider  to  fill  this  gap.
In order  to correct  for  the selection  bias  inherent  to the  evaluation  of activation  strategies,  we  exploit
the  discretionary  room  of  the  case  managers  in  setting  up treatment  plans.  We  find  that  graded  return-





workers  who  would  otherwise  have  not  rehabilitated.  Work  resumption  can  be  achieved  faster  when
graded  return-to-work  is started  earlier  and  may  permanently  increase  when  started  at  a  higher  rate
of  work  resumption.  These  findings  however  do  not  hold  for  individuals  who  have  problems  related  to
mental  health.
© 2019  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.raded return-to-work
. Introduction
In the past decades many Western countries have seen a rise in
ptake of disability benefits (OECD, 2010). In an effort to curb this
rend, there has been an increased focus on what disabled individ-
als can do at work, rather than what they cannot. For example, in
ngland sick notes have been replaced by a statement of fitness for
ork in 2010 (Wainwright et al., 2011), in Sweden general practi-
ioners are recommended to subscribe part-time sick leave rather
han full time sick leave (Kausto et al., 2008) and in Norway sick-
isted employees are since 2004 required to work partially after 8
eeks of sick leave unless a physician has stated this is impossi-
le (Hernæs, 2017). In a similar vein, part-time sick leave is often
sed as a workplace based intervention aimed at speeding up the
ehabilitation process of sick-listed employees. In these interven-
 The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Instituut Gak for
his research project. They also thank the referees to this paper, Bénédicte Rouland,
ob Euwals and Bertjan Teunissen for detailed comments and suggestions on earlier
ersions of the paper, as well as seminar participants that gave feedback at the
ALE conference in St. Gallen in 2017 and the research seminars at CPB Netherlands
ureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the University of Antwerp and RWI  in Essen.
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ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.03.009
167-6296/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.tions usually the amount of hours worked gradually increases over
time, up to the moment that full work resumption is achieved. The
idea is that graded work prevents the loss of working skills and
may  even speed up the recovery from certain injuries. For instance,
Andren and Svensson (2012) argue that particularly individuals
with musculo-skeletal problems benefit from graded work activ-
ities. Likewise, Individual Placement and Support (IPS) interventions
for sick workers with mental impairments are built upon the idea
that work activities may  contribute to the recovery process.
Research shows almost unanimously positive effects of graded
work on work rehabilitation,1 whereas interventions like voca-
tional rehabilitation and regular paramedical care rather seem to
lengthen sick spells (Markussen and Røed, 2014; Rehwald et al.,
2018). This however does not mean that graded return-to-work is
beneficial for all individuals (Andren and Svensson, 2012; Andren,
2014; Høgelund et al., 2012). Starting graded work trajectories too
soon or for too many hours may induce stress or strain on the body,
1 See e.g. Bernacki et al. (2000), Bethge (2016), Hernæs (2017), Høgelund et al.
(2010), Kausto et al. (2014), Markussen et al. (2012), Rehwald et al. (2018),
Viikari-Juntura et al. (2012). The general finding that graded work increases work
resumption is confirmed in peer reviewed papers on the effects of part-time sick
leave, active sick leave, phased return to work, and graded return to work. Related
to this literature, evidence on graded work exposure also points at positive results,





























































90 L. Kools, P. Koning / Journal of H
ampering the recovery process. In light of these considerations,
t is important to understand what separates an effective graded
eturn-to-work trajectory from an ineffective one.
In this paper we analyze how the set-up of a graded return-
o-work trajectory determines its effectiveness. More specifically,
e analyze if work resumption rates change when the trajectory is
tarted at a higher initial rate of work resumption or if it is starter
ater. For this we make use of registered data from a private work-
lace reintegration provider, which performs case management for
ostly small and medium sized firms. This provider offered rein-
egration services for about 12,000 long-term sick listed workers,
f which 62% participated in graded work trajectories between
he years 2011 and 2014. We  observe detailed worker informa-
ion on the timing and the degree of grading that is used, as well
s information on impairment types, employer, and other indi-
idual characteristics. We  enrich these data with information on
he case managers that were assigned to them by the workplace
eintegration provider.
In order to correct for the selection bias inherent to the evalu-
tion of activation strategies, we follow an instrumental variables
pproach for which we exploit the discretionary room of the case
anagers in setting up treatment plans. We  use the tendency of
 case manager to focus on graded work (i.e., the ‘graded work
ropensity’) as an instrument to actually receiving such a strategy.
n doing so, we follow a strand of literature applying this technique
n the context of activation strategies for sick-listed employees,
uch as Dean et al. (2015), Markussen and Røed (2014) and Rehwald
t al. (2018).2 As case managers may  learn on the job or change their
reference for graded work, we allow graded work propensities to
ary across years. Our key assumption is that the assignment of
new) sick-listed workers to case managers is exogenous. We  argue
hat this assumption is plausible, as the assignment is driven by the
irect availability of case managers. All the individual information
n new sick-listed workers that is available to the case managers at
he moment of intake is included in our data. This means that any
election on observables can be controlled for.
Our analysis extends on earlier studies in this field of research
y also using a propensity measure for the initial degree of grad-
ng. In line with earlier work, we will first define case managers’
ropensity measures as the likelihood of initiating a trajectory for
ick-listed workers that have not started one yet. We  next construct
 propensity score measure for the initial graded work percentage
hat is applied. This then enables us to evaluate the effects of differ-
nces in the degree of grading interventions on work resumption.
s both propensities for the frequency and the degree of grading
re correlated, we also estimate a model for work resumption with
oth the grading tendency and the degree of grading as explana-
ories. As such, we can analyze whether different dimensions of
rading are interrelated and isolate their effects on work resump-
ion. In addition, we shed new light on the determinants of graded
ork propensities and the implications of this for the interpreta-
ion of our findings. Even though the case managers’ tendencies to
se graded work interventions are plausibly exogenous, we  cannot
e sure that they are uncorrelated with other case manager charac-
eristics affecting the likelihood of work resumption. We  therefore
onduct sensitivity tests with proxies for case manager quality as
dditional controls, including past work resumption rates of other
2 For the Dutch case, where sick-listed employees have to follow a return-to-
ork plan established in the beginning of the sick-spell, we  prefer this approach
ver  the use of proportional hazard models, as used by for example Høgelund et al.
2010) for the case of Denmark, which relies on the non-anticipation assumption.
ther methods used in the context of graded return-to-work are propensity score
atching (Bethge, 2016) and randomized control trials (Viikari-Juntura et al., 2012).Economics 65 (2019) 189–209
sick-listed workers that were assigned to the case manager and
work resumption rates of sick-listed workers that are out of sample.
We find that graded return-to-work has the potential to speed
up the recovery process, but does not necessarily help rehabilitate
individuals who  would otherwise have not rehabilitated. Graded
work that is initiated in the first 26 weeks of absence yields an
increase of 18 weeks in the number of weeks worked during the
first two  years after sick-listing, but has no significant effects on the
probability to return to work within two years. Starting a graded
return-to-work trajectory at a work resumption rate which is 10
percentage point higher increases the probability to return to work
within 2 years with four percentage point. This suggests that a suffi-
ciently high degree of grading is crucial to realize work resumption
levels that are permanent. Finally, the positive effects of graded
return-to-work are especially strong and persistent for individuals
who have general medical conditions. For individuals with prob-
lems related to mental health we  find no significant overall effects
of graded return-to-work.
In the following section, we explain the system of sick leave and
disability insurance in the Netherlands. Then, in Section 3 we pro-
vide descriptive statistics on the sick-listed individuals in the data
set, the graded return-to-work trajectories, and the case managers.
In Section 4, we explain our empirical strategy and underlying
assumptions. We  present the results of the analysis in Section 5,
followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Institutional setting
The Dutch disability system used to be notorious for its large
and increasing number of beneficiaries; at its peak those receiving
benefits amounted up to 12% of the insured workers (Koning and
Lindeboom, 2015). Since the beginning of the 21st century disability
insurance award rates have been steadily declining, due to a num-
ber of reforms to the system that focused on the sickness period
that precedes DI claims. Among these reforms was the introduction
of the Gatekeeper Protocol, obliging employers and employees to
engage in activities aimed at reintegrating sick-listed workers into
the workforce. As a consequence of this reform, disability insur-
ance inflow was  estimated to reduce by about 40% (van Sonsbeek
and Gradus, 2013). This positive effect can partly be attributed to
improved screening, making it more difficult to use DI as an alterna-
tive exit route for Unemployment Insurance (de Jong et al., 2011).
Moreover, increased employer responsibilities have played a cru-
cial role in curbing the rise in DI beneficiaries, both as a stimulus to
actively prevent sickness and as a way to accommodate activation
strategies for sick-listed workers (Koning and Lindeboom, 2015).
As a result of the reforms, the Netherlands has a largely privately
organized sickness and disability system (Koning, 2017). This par-
ticularly holds for the 2 year waiting period that precedes DI claims.
In this period, the employer is obliged to continue payments of
at least 70% of the employees regular salary.3 In practice, most
Collective Labor Agreements stipulate full wage payments in the
first year and 70% in the second year. During the waiting period,
the employer and the employee are obliged to undertake efforts
towards re-integration of the sick-listed employee. The Gatekeeper
Protocol (in Dutch: Wet  verbetering Poortwachter) gives directions
as to what these efforts should entail.4 Employers can insure them-
selves against the risk of the continued wage payments during the
3 For comparison, in Scandinavian countries employers are responsible for two
to  three weeks of continued wage payments, after which the Social Insurance
Administration (Sweden/Norway) or municipalities (Denmark) take over the burden
(Andren, 2014; Markussen and Røed, 2014; Rehwald et al., 2018).
4 For a detailed description of the concrete steps that need to be taken under the
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aiting period via private insurers or even opt for ‘broad insurance’
hat includes all the costs and activities that come with the obli-
ations of the Gatekeeper protocol. Approximately 76% of Dutch
mployers has insurance for the risk of continued sick payments
nd at least 67% has such a broad insurance (de Jong et al., 2014).
his predominantly includes smaller employers.
During the waiting period, the sick-listed employee is allowed
o work partially. The employee can either do therapeutic work,
herein he or she is considered an extra pair of hands, or do
raded work. In the latter case, the employee engages in produc-
ive work, the employer pays for those productive hours worked,
nd the insurer only pays for the hours foregone. For example, if
n employee engages for 20% in graded work, he gets paid 100% of
is pre-sickness wage of which 80% is covered by the insurer and
0% by the employer. As the case managers are hired by the insurer,
hey have a direct financial incentive to actively keep track of the
ndividuals’ residual earnings capacity and to try to get the individ-
al to participate in paid work for as much as deemed possible. For
mployers, sickness absence may  be costly for other reasons than
age continuation, noncooperation may  lead to an extension of
he waiting period, and potential DI benefit costs after the waiting
eriod are experience rated. Moreover, for sick-listed employees,
on-cooperation with reintegration plans inhibits the risk of get-
ing fired or loosing eligibility to DI benefits.5
The data used in this paper come from a private workplace rein-
egration provider that is the sole provider of case management for
wo large insurers, together holding a market share of about 30% of
he insurances for continued wage payments (de Jong et al., 2014).
he workplace reintegration provider offers different types of prod-
cts, from the registration of sickness absence to case management
or individuals at risk of long-term absence. In the current study, we
ocus on the individuals assigned to case management. Employers
ho take out the ‘broad’ insurance package with either of the two
nsurers are automatically directed to our workplace reintegration
rovider for case management. Those who are only insured against
ontinued wage payments can opt to work with a case manager
rom within their own company, hire an external case manager, or
ire the services of the case manager of our workplace reintegration
rovider.
In a typical case management trajectory a sick-listed employee
s directed to our workplace reintegration provider after a dis-
bility assessment is made by the company doctor. When there
s an indication for imminent long-term absenteeism at that time
nd the contract with the provider includes case management,
he employee gets assigned to a case manager. The assignment of
ick-listed employees to case managers is based on caseload, i.e.
he case manager that has time takes on the sick-listed employee.
his means case managers are not specialized in specific health
roblems, sectors, or regions.6 It is important to stress that case
anagers working at our workplace reintegration provider are not
octors. Usually, case managers have a background in law, HR, or
para)medical care. They purely serve as a manager of the reintegra-
5 The evidence also confirms that private workplace reintegration providers usu-
lly  increase reintegration activities in the waiting period (Everhardt and de Jong,
011). This suggests that the provision of insurance does not (fully) remove the
ncentive to achieve work resumption.
6 The workplace reintegration provider has only one office, located in the center of
he country. Contact with the sick-listed employee is mostly maintained via phone
nd email. Also, the workplace reintegration provider does not specialize in a certain
ector. When we  compare sectoral information from the data source to the sectoral
nformation from Statistics Netherlands, we  find that employees from non-profit
ervice sectors, like care and education, are underrepresented in the data. Con-
rasting to for-profit firms, organizations in these sectors typically have specialized
eintegration providers. For the remaining group of private for-profit organizations,
ector shares of the employers of sick-listed workers in our sample are in line with
hose for the Netherlands.Economics 65 (2019) 189–209 191
tion process: consulting with the occupational physician, keeping
in regular contact with the employer and sick-listed employee,
identifying the steps to be taken by the employer and employee,
putting together the return to work plan, and administrating the
process.
3. Data
3.1. Characteristics of sick-listed employees
We have access to all files on sick-listed employees that were
assigned to case management at our private workplace reintegra-
tion provider between the years 2011 and 2014. All individuals are
followed for two  years after the first sick day (or until they recover
if that is within two  years). For the last individual in our sample the
sick spell starts in the week of October 20, 2014. The last week in
our sample is the week of October 17, 2016. We  exclude those indi-
viduals that hold specific insurance contracts with extra services
before case management and/or earlier entry into case manage-
ment (when there is not yet a risk of long term sickness). These
excluded contracts are predominantly held by self-employed. Pro-
vided that we  use the case managers’ grading practice as a means
of identification we need sufficient observations per case manager.
We therefore exclude those clients that were assigned to casework-
ers with less than 25 clients in a particular year.7 The data covers
11,741 sick-listed employees that are assigned to 68 case managers.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sick-listed employ-
ees both for those who  did and those who  did not participate
in a graded return-to-work arrangement. We define an individ-
ual to be in graded return-to-work when his wage value, e.g. the
degree of pre-sickness productive work time resumption, exceeds
0%. Roughly 60% of the individuals in our data set participate in
graded return-to-work at some point during their sick spell. The
two groups are comparable in terms of age, gender, and moment
of application8 ; the differences in means are statistically signifi-
cant in some cases, but not substantial. The graded individuals do
not earn significantly more than the non-graded individuals.9 The
compositions of the groups are slightly different when it comes to
the diagnoses. For example, people who  have a conflict at work
rarely enter a graded return-to-work trajectory. Presumably, coop-
eration of the employer and possibly work place adaption is more
troublesome in situations where there is a conflict.
Those in graded return-to-work have on average less time
devoted to them by their case manager than those who  are not in
graded return-to-work. Despite the longer average sickness dura-
tion, those participating in graded return-to-work have a higher
probability of returning to work in the longer run. This is also
reflected in Fig. 1 showing survival probabilities and hazard rates
for individuals who started a graded return-to-work in the first
year of their sick leave and for individuals who did not start a
graded return-to-work in the first year, respectively. By construc-
tion, individuals participating in graded return-to-work have a
lower probability to recover in the first weeks of illness. Still,
7 Table A1 of Appendix A shows the selection of our data in more detail.
8 Fig. A1 in Appendix A shows that roughly half of the individuals do enter case
management before the eighth week of sickness absence. However, it also shows
that there is quite some spread in the moment at which the individuals start case
management. As the elapsed duration until intake is likely to affect both the likeli-
hood of graded work and work resumption, we take this into account in our empirical
analysis.
9 Information on the education level of individuals was not recorded. If necessary,
case  managers obtained this information during the intake of new clients instead.
In  the empirical literature, information on education levels of sick-listed workers is
usually derived from public registered data or survey data. Recording this informa-
tion  by private organizations is however not common in the Netherlands. Still, we
argue that wage earnings can be a good proxy for the education level of workers.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics sick-listed employees.
All No graded rtw Graded rtw p-Valuea
Number of sick-listed employees 11,741 4,504 (38.4%) 7,237 (61.6%)
%  female 47.3% 49.6% 45.9% 0.000
Age  at start of case management 42.4 41.9 42.8 0.000
Weeks  until start of case management 9.2 9.3 9.1 0.207
Gross  pre-sickness wage (euro/day) 255.86 235.12 268.76 0.458
Firm  size
– 1 employee 15.2% 17.0% 14.1% 0.000
–  2–9 employees 36.3% 37.5% 35.5% 0.031
–  10–49 employees 35.8% 32.8% 37.7% 0.000
–  50 or more employees 2.6% 1.9% 3.1% 0.000
–  Number of employees unknown 10.1% 10.9% 9.5% 0.020
Type  of condition
– General medical – mildb 7.7% 10.9% 5.7% 0.000
–  General medical – medium 13.5% 11.7% 14.7% 0.000
–  General medical – severe 11.5% 10.5% 12.1% 0.007
–  Physical – mild 7.1% 6.9% 7.3% 0.395
–  Physical – severe 3.6% 3.3% 3.8% 0.127
–  Neck, shoulder, arm complaints 6.9% 5.6% 7.7% 0.000
–  Hip, ankle, knee complaints 6.3% 4.7% 7.4% 0.000
–  Back complaints 7.3% 6.2% 8.1% 0.000
–  Psychiatric 1.8% 1.9% 1.7% 0.442
–  Psychological – mild 11.4% 10.4% 12.0% 0.007
–  Psychological – severe 2.8% 2.6% 2.9% 0.303
–  Psychosocial – mild 10.7% 10.1% 11.0% 0.106
–  Psychosocial – severe 1.8% 1.4% 2.0% 0.004
–  Social problems 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 0.751
–  Conflict 4.0% 8.6% 1.1% 0.000
–  Otherc 1.5% 3.2% 0.4% 0.000
Time  allocated to claimant (min/week) 17.0 23.1 13.2 0.000
Weeks  until closing of file 42.1 36.0 45.9 0.000
Returns to work within 1 year 59.6% 53.6% 63.3% 0.000
Returns to work within 2 years 76.7% 59.3% 87.6% 0.000
a Two-sided t-test on difference between sample with graded work and no graded work, with unequal variances.
b When it comes to general medical conditions one must think of individuals who are recovering from surgery or suffer from chronic illness.












with case managers treating up to 123 individuals a year at max-
imum.  As noted earlier, we excluded those case manager-years in
which a case manager treated less than 25 individuals.10
10 In Appendix A, we present the results of robustness analyses that take different
cutoffs (see Tables A7–A9). When setting the cutoff too low, the average behavior
of  case managers with only a few clients is more likely to be a poor representation
of  grading practices. This will weaken the explanatory power of the instrument.Fig. 1. Survival and hazard rates for individuals with 
he group starts to perform better than those not participating in
raded return-to-work from about the 25th week onward, lead-
ng to substantially lower probabilities of non-recovery in the 70th
eek. The hazard rate spikes after the first year of sick-leave and at
he end of the second year, which mirrors the two annual evaluation
oments in the Gatekeeper Protocol.
.2. Characteristics of case managersTable 2 shows case manager characteristics of our sample. We
ave information on 68 case managers, who are predominantly
emale (70.6%). They have on average about 68 sick-listed employ-
es assigned to them per year. There is quite some spread however,ithout graded return-to-work in first year of absence.When setting the cutoff too high, however, many observations need to be dropped,
thus  decreasing the efficiency of the estimations. As we will show, both the point
estimates as the standard errors turn out to be hardly affected by the choice of
cutoff. When we look into all the case managers in the original sample, 24% is never
dropped, 43% is dropped only once, and for 29% of case managers all observations
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Table  2
Descriptive statistics of the 68 case managers.a
Mean sd Min  Max
(a) Characteristics of case manager
Female 70.6%
Age  on 1 November 2014 39.1 10.1 25 65
Number of clients per year 68.4 23.1 25 123
(b)  Characteristics of the clients of case managers
Fraction of clients female 48.5% 14.8% 20.9% 76.6%
Average age at start of case management 42.4 1.7 37.6 46.1
Weeks until start of case management 9.1 1.1 60.4 11.1
Average gross pre-sickness wage (euro/day) 253.08 242.16 76.45 1317.26
Median gross pre-sickness wage (euro/day) 108.12 5.04 84.36 110.00
Fraction of clients from firm size categories
– 1 employee 15.1% 5.7% 2.6% 30.6%
–  2 to 9 employees 36.5% 5.8% 24.0% 51.9%
–  10 to 49 employees 35.4% 7.8% 13.3% 56.0%
–  50 or more employees 2.8% 3.5% 0.0% 23.1%
–  Number of employees unknown 10.2% 3.4% 3.6% 18.3%
Fraction of clients with condition type
–  General medical – mildb 8.3% 6.8% 0.0% 28.8%
–  General medical – medium 13.3% 6.0% 3.7% 41.0%
-  General medical – severe 10.9% 4.6% 0.0% 25.3%
-  Physical – mild 7.4% 7.0% 0.0% 39.3%
-  Physical – severe 3.7% 2.8% 0.0% 17.6%
–  Neck, shoulder, arm complaints 6.7% 3.9% 0.0% 19.0%
–  Hip, ankle, knee complaints 6.4% 3.8% 0.0% 16.4%
–  Back complaints 7.2% 3.2% 0.0% 17.5%
–  Psychiatric 1.7% 1.4% 0.0% 6.3%
–  Psychological – mild 11.6% 7.8% 0.0% 40.7%
–  Psychological – severe 2.8% 3.0% 0.0% 19.3%
–  Psychosocial – mild 10.4% 7.2% 0.0% 33.1%
–  Psychosocial – severe 1.7% 1.8% 0.0% 8.5%
–  Social problems 2.3% 3.6% 0.0% 21.4%
–  Conflict 4.1% 2.5% 0.0% 11.9%
–  Otherc 1.5% 2.0% 0.0% 8.0%
(c)  Activities and results of case managers
Fraction of clients in graded work 60.2% 8.2% 33.9% 77.4%
Average time allocated to client (min/week) 17.0 3.1 10.6 28.4
Average weeks until closing of file 41.0 6.2 21.2 57.2
Fraction of clients returned to work within one year 60.8% 10.3% 23.3% 92.0%























a See Table A2 in Appendix A for descriptives of the working hours and the educa
b When it comes to general medical conditions one must think of individuals wh
c ‘Other’ contains conditions such as flu and complaints due to pregnancy.
In principle individuals are assigned to case managers based on
aseload. That is, new clients are directed to those who  have time.
owever, there seems to be some clustering at certain case man-
gers based on gender and type of diseases. More specifically, the
pread of the case manager averages is relatively high for these vari-
bles. This could hint at some form of specialization, in the sense
hat case managers select those individuals that they know best
ow to deal with. However, when it comes to the diagnoses of the
lients, the variation is more likely to be a result of the reporting
ehaviour of the case managers than reflecting selection. This is
ecause the diagnoses are established by the case managers after
he clients are assigned to them. We  will return to this issue in
ection 5.4.
Case managers differ substantially in their use of graded return-
o-work, with some only having 33.6% of their clients in graded
eturn-to-work and others having up to 82.6% of their clients
articipating in graded return-to-work. Apart from using graded
eturn-to-work, case managers can also apply other interventions
o their clients. Case managers documented these interventions in
 separate file that can be linked to the individual clients. Unfortu-
re dropped. The case managers that are dropped are predominantly those with
ower education who work fewer hours or who  are active in the year 2011.evel of case managers.
ecovering from surgery or suffer from chronic illness.
nately, this ‘intervention file’ turned out to be incomplete, so that it
contained far fewer interventions than the reintegration provider
would have expected, especially in the years 2011 and 2012. We
therefore chose to abstain from using this file for the analysis.
However, assuming that the missing interventions are missing at
random, we conclude that clients who  do not enter graded return-
to-work are not more often enrolled in other interventions. Most
of the interventions consist of advisory meetings with workers or
psychological and physical care. Vocational training is not included
in the options for interventions.
3.3. Setup of graded return-to-work trajectories
Within the group of clients that started a graded work trajec-
tory, relevant outcome measures are the moment and the degree
at which grading is started. The variable ‘wage value’, which we use
to construct our graded return-to-work index, contains any integer
value ranging from 0 to 100 and can be updated up to 24 times at
maximum in a two-year-trajectory. Case managers are encouraged
to fill in the variable succinctly, as any degree of work resumption
implies lower costs for the workplace reintegration provider. The
extent to which we can use this detailed information depends on
the variation in the graded return-to-work trajectories.







































on the incidence of work resumption and the number of sickness
weeks, we  closely follow Markussen and Røed (2014) and Rehwald
et al. (2018). In these analyses, the aim is to estimate the effect
12 When performing a decomposition analysis of the observed variation in graded-
work applications across case managers and employers, we see indeed that the
individual’s employer is more important than the individual’s case manager. As long
as  individual’s are randomly assigned to case managers, however, this does not
burden our analysis. At most, it decreases the efficiency of our method.
13 Obviously, testing for clustering on unobservable characteristics is more com-ig. 2. Percentage of individuals participating in graded return-to-work per week.
Fig. 2 shows the percentage of individuals participating in
raded return-to-work in a certain week, where we define five
ategories of graded work: 1–20%, 21–40%, 41–60%, 61–80%, and
1–100% of the pre-sickness wage value, respectively.11 The fig-
re shows that in the first weeks of sickness individuals usually
ork modest amounts of time (21–60% graded work). Towards the
0th week, individuals participate more often in high degrees of
raded work resumption (81–100%) or very low degrees (<20%). In
he later weeks (when most have recovered), those who are still in
raded return-to-work mostly work modest amounts of time, i.e.
20% graded work resumption.
Table 3 shows the variation in grading practice of the different
ase managers. On average case managers wait 20.85 weeks before
tarting the graded return-to-work and do so at a degree of 36.01%.
he fastest case manager waits on average 12.56 weeks and the
lowest 25.92. The case manager that starts grading at the lowest
egree does so at 28.26% on average and the one that starts the
ighest does so at 55.15% on average. There are some case man-
gers that never start a graded return-to-work arrangement after
2 weeks, while others start almost a third of the trajectories that
ate. Also, some case managers never start a graded return-to-work
rrangement at 1–20% of pre-sickness wage value, whereas others
tart almost half the arrangements at this level. We  thus conclude




To identify the effectiveness of graded return-to-work at
ncreasing full work resumption, we use an instrumental variable
IV) method which was introduced by Duggan (2005). Duggan ana-
yzes how expenses on new drugs affect total medical expenditures
y exploiting the variation in psychiatrists’ preferences in drugs
rescription as an instrument for individual expenses on types of
ew drugs. In a similar fashion, more recent applications exploit
ariation in strictness of disability examiners and judges in award-
ng disability benefits (Maestas et al., 2013; French and Song, 2014)
nd the propensities of employment offices or individual casework-
rs to use certain interventions (Dean et al., 2015; Markussen and
11 When calculating this percentage, we include individuals from the first sick day
p  until the end of the 105th sick week (so also after recovery). As a result, the
umerator remains unchanged.Economics 65 (2019) 189–209
Røed, 2014; Rehwald et al., 2018; Markussen et al., 2018). Our
approach is most similar to Markussen et al. (2012), who exploit
variation in physicians’ use of graded absence certificates to identify
the effect of part-time sick leave on absence duration.
In our case, employees are sent to the reintegration provider
after some weeks of absence. The provider assigns them to a case
manager, who has substantial discretionary room in choosing the
specific treatment for the client. Case managers are encouraged to
use graded return-to-work whenever possible. However, the actual
grading practice may  vary among the case managers. First, case
managers may  make different assessments of when an individual
is ready to start graded return-to-work. Second, one cannot sim-
ply assign an individual to graded return-to-work in all relevant
work environments. The case manager has to negotiate the pos-
sibilities of adapted work duties with the employer (Wainwright
et al., 2011).12 One case manager may  be better in this negoti-
ation process than the other, speeding up the process towards
graded return-to-work. Hence, whether an individual participates
in graded return-to-work and when he starts to do so, may  depend
on the case manager he is assigned to. This means the case man-
ager’s propensity to grade can be used to instrument the graded
return-to-work variable.
In the current analysis, the validity of instrumental variables
estimation essentially requires four conditions to be met. First,
someone’s probability of graded work should be affected by the
concerning case managers’ propensity to use a graded work for
the other clients assigned to him. With a time span of four years
that is covered, assuming the tendency to use graded work to be
constant over time may  be too restrictive. We  therefore construct
propensities by case manager for each year in our sample. Sec-
ond, we assume that sick workers are assigned randomly to case
managers. This implies that sick-listed individuals with long and
short expected sick durations do not cluster among certain case
managers. We  can test this assumption by excluding client charac-
teristics or by excluding case managers who have abnormal client
group compositions.13 Third, we  rely upon the assumption that
graded work effects are not correlated with the general ability of
case managers in getting individuals back to work (i.e., the ‘exclu-
sion restriction’). We  will address this issue in sensitivity tests
with proxies of overall case manager quality as additional con-
trols. Finally, we  assume that propensities affect the probability of
graded work equally across types of individuals – the ‘monotonic-
ity’ assumption.14
4.2. Specification of the effect of graded work
When specifying the IV model for the effect of graded-workplex, but it should be stressed that case managers did not receive more information
than the registered data we have. This renders it plausible there was  no selection
on unobservables.
14 To analyze the stringency of the monotonicity assumption, we have compared
first-stage IV coefficients across diagnosis subgroups (see Table A10 of Appendix
B  for the results). For most diagnoses these are comparable, but not for all. When
clustering sick types to broader subgroups that we will use in Section 5.3, however,
we  get first-stage results that are very similar – see panel (b). It thus appears that
the differences in first-stage estimates for the detailed subcategories largely stem
from small group size.
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Table  3
Variation in grading practices across case managers.
Mean sd Min Max
Average weeks waited until start of graded rtw 20.85 2.83 12.56 25.92
Average degree of grading at start of graded rtw 36.01% 4.24% 28.26% 55.15%
Fraction of graded rtw that started
1–8 weeks 13.90% 5.82% 3.85% 31.34%
9–16  weeks 35.14% 6.39% 22.95% 55.56%
16–24  weeks 22.42% 6.07% 8.96% 36.84%
24–32  weeks 11.97% 3.84% 3.70% 23.08%
After  32 weeks 16.56% 6.51% 0.00% 28.32%
Fraction of graded rtw started at a grade between
1–20% of pre-sickness wage 26.4% 8.5% 0.0% 47.4%



































41–60% of pre-sickness wage 31.3% 
61–80% of pre-sickness wage 4.0% 
81–100% of pre-sickness wage 3.7% 
f the provision of graded work (G). As we will show later on, we
xtend their analysis by developing case manager propensities for
he initial degree of grading (S). For ease of exposition, we consider a
ingle year for which we construct case manager propensities. This
etup can be adapted by allowing for case manager propensities for
ach year.
We  structure the cross sectional data on the sick-listed individ-
als to a panel where every period t corresponds to one week. We
nclude all individual-weeks in the first year of the sick-spell up to
nd including the week in which graded work started or, in case of
he absence of a graded work treatment, until the sick spell ended
i.e., individual went back to work or entered the DI scheme). Then,
e run an OLS regression on a dummy  indicating whether the indi-
idual is or is not starting to participate in graded work that week.
n this regression we control for time constant individual charac-
eristics xi for individual i (e.g. age, age squared, sex, sick type, log
ross (pre-sickness) wage, log gross (pre-sickness) wage squared,
rm size, year of application, type of insurance contract, sick dura-
ion until application at the re-integration office), together with
eriod dummies (dateit), and dummies for all possible outcomes of
lapsed sick weeks (dit):
gradedijt = x′i
g + ıg1 dit + ı
g




i = 1, . . .n  (individuals),
j = 1, . . .J  (case managers),
t = 1, . . .T  (periods),
(1)
here we cluster standard errors across case manager-year com-
inations. The parameters g, ıg1 and ı
g
2 describe the effects of
ndividual characteristics, the elapsed sick weeks and period dum-
ies, respectively.
Using the estimated individual errors ûg
ijt
, we next construct the
ase manager propensities to treat g
i
. We  sum the errors over the









here Ti is the last period individual i is at risk of making a transition
nto treatment. Following Markussen and Røed (2014) and Rehwald
t al. (2018), ûg
ij
can be interpreted as the difference between the
uration until treatment of individual i and the average duration
ntil treatment for individuals with the same pre-treatment char-




case manager, while leaving out ûg
ij












where Nj is the set of individuals corresponding to case manager
j. For ease of interpretation, we rescale these  g
i
from 0 to 1, with
0 indicating the lowest propensity to use graded work and 1 indi-
cating the highest propensity to use graded work. To estimate the
effect of graded return-to-work on the probability to return to
work (yi), we  collapse the data to one observation per individual.
This observation may  either be the probability of work resump-
tion or the number of weeks that have been worked over a certain
time window. We  estimate the effect of having participated in
graded return-to-work on the return-to-work probability, using the
propensity to grade ( g
i
) as an instrumental variable. We  control for
the same individual characteristics as in the propensity regressions.
This yields the following IV model:
yi = x′iˇ
g + gĜi + gi , (4)






where we  cluster standard errors across all combinations of case
managers and years in our sample. As with any IV model, it is
important to stress that our parameter of interest in the above equa-
tion, g, should be interpreted as a local average treatment effect
(LATE). This parameter denotes the effect of increases in the like-
lihood of grading for only those individuals that are susceptive to
grading practices of case managers. This result does not necessarily
extrapolate to all individuals in our sample.
4.3. Specification of the effect of the degree of grading
Similar to the propensities for the frequency of graded work, we
construct case manager propensities that can be used to explain
the effect of the degree of grading (as a share of the maximum
work hours) on the likelihood of work resumption. We  calculate
a propensity based only on the percentage of pre-sickness hours
worked during the first week of graded return-to-work, i.e. the
starting level denoted by Sij. For those individuals that are not
graded, we  set this percentage equal to zero. We  estimate a regres-
sion on this outcome variable that largely corresponds to Eq. (1):Sij = x′i
s + ıs1 di + ıs2 datei + usij,
i = 1, . . .n (individuals)
j  = 1, . . .J  (case managers),
(6)
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Table 4
Effects of graded return-to-work (rtw) on full work resumption.
Intervention Graded rtw started in week 1–52 Graded rtw started in week 1–26
Returned to work Weeks worked in Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years Week 1–52 Week 1–104 1 year 2 years Week 1–52 Week 1–104
(a) OLS estimates
Graded return-to-work 0.184*** 0.300*** 0.251 14.98*** 0.280*** 0.225*** 4.865*** 17.78***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.287) (0.719) (0.009) (0.008) (0.264) (0.636)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.198 0.181 0.296 0.244 0.239 0.131 0.319 0.262
(b)  IV estimates
Graded return-to-work 0.127 0.075 1.173 6.642 0.380*** 0.070 8.901** 18.30**
(0.122) (0.109) (3.581) (8.531) (0.125) (0.104) (3.759) (8.624)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.195 0.117 0.296 0.231 0.230 0.101 0.303 0.262
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.270*** 0.268***
(0.0268) (0.0267)
(c)  Reduced form estimates of propensity
 g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.034 0.020 0.317 1.793 0.102*** 0.019 2.386** 4.907**
(0.033) (0.030) (0.970) (2.333) (0.035) (0.028) (1.014) (2.372)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.167 0.068 0.296 0.201 0.168 0.068 0.297 0.202

































sick leave as a treatment, with individuals who started graded work
after the 26 weeks considered as untreated. Compared to the earlier
results with 52 weeks as a maximum, there are noticeable differ-
15 5.3% of untreated individuals start a graded return-to-work trajectory in the
second year of sick leave. Since these trajectories start later in time than outcomelaimants are excluded when their assigned case manager treated fewer than 25 cl
lustered (case manager–year) standard errors in parentheses.
/**/*** indicate p-levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Using the error estimates of the above equation, we  calculate
ropensities as in Eq. (3) for individual i with case manager j. We
enote these as  s
i
. We  instrument the initial degree of grading
ith the average initial degree of grading for all other sick listed
orkers that were assigned to this case manager. This enables us
o conduct an IV regression as above using the degree of graded
ork resumption rate at the start of graded return-to-work as the
ntervention, together with x as control variables:
i = x′iˇ
s + sŜi + si , (7)
i = x′is + ˛s si + si . (8)
here we allow for clustering effects across combinations of case
anager and years.
As the initial degree of grading is set equal to zero for those
ndividuals that are not graded, it is likely that the proxies for the
requency and the degree of grading are correlated. For a broader
nterpretation of our results, we therefore also specify a model
hat allows for both the frequency and the level of grading as
ndogenous regressors. This corresponds to e.g. Markussen and
øed (2014), who analyze the effectiveness of different treatment
trategies on return-to-work rates of sick-listed workers. In our
ase, this implies the following IV model with two  endogenous
egressors and two propensities as instruments and with the addi-
ional coefficients ˛g,s and ˛s,g:
i = x′iˇ
s + gĜi + sŜisi (9)
i = x′ig + ˛g 
g
i




i = x′is + ˛s,g 
g
i
+ ˛s si + si . (11)
here we allow for clustering effects across combinations of case
anagers and years.
. Results.1. The overall effect of graded return-to-work
Table 4 shows the effects of graded return-to-work trajecto-
ies on (1) a dummy  variable indicating whether the sick-listedts in the same year as the claimant.
employee returned to work within 1 year; (2) a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the sick-listed employee returned to work
within 2 years; (3) the number of weeks worked in the first year; (4)
the number of weeks worked in the first 2 years. Panel (a) shows the
OLS results, panel (b) shows the IV results and panel (c) shows the
reduced form or ‘Intention-to-Treat’ estimates for the case manager
propensity measure. The results for the regressions underlying the
propensities and all estimated coefficients of the regressions are
shown in Tables A3 and A4 of Appendix B.
Columns 1–4 of Table 4 present the baseline results, where we
consider an individual as treated if he enters a graded return-to-
work trajectory within the first year of sick leave.15 Based on the
OLS results, one would conclude that graded return-to-work tra-
jectories have substantial and positive effects. The IV estimates
however show only moderate and statistically insignificant effects,
suggesting positive selection into the treatment. This is best illus-
trated by the outcomes at the end of the second year. The OLS
estimates indicate a 30 percentage point increase in return to work
probabilities for individuals on a graded return-to-work trajec-
tory, whereas the IV estimates show only a 7.5 percentage point
(insignificant) increase. Similarly, the reduced form estimates indi-
cate that individuals assigned to a case manager with the highest
propensity to use graded return-to-work are only 2 percentage
point more likely to rehabilitate within two years than those
assigned to the case manager with the lowest propensity to use
graded work.
Columns 5–8 show the results when only considering graded
return-to-work trajectories which started in the first 26 weeks ofvariables (1) and (3), we  consider these individuals as untreated. When we do con-
sider them as treated and estimate the effects at the end of the two year waiting
period, outcome variables (2) and (4), we find slightly smaller effects: return to work
probabilities increase by 0.049 (0.112), the number of weeks worked increases by
1.728 (8.680).
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Table  5
Effects of the starting degree of grading on full work resumption.
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years Week 1–52 Week 1–104
(a) OLS estimates
Starting level (0–100) 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.054*** 0.306***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.014)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.203 0.135 0.303 0.244
(b)  IV estimates
Starting level (0–100) 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.132*** 0.421***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.049) (0.113)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.187 0.134 0.289 0.238
Stage  1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 22.50***
(0.613)
(c)  Reduced form estimates of propensity
s
i
(propensity starting level) 0.154*** 0.111*** 2.971*** 9.463***
(0.036) (0.033) (1.101) (2.571)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.169 0.070 0.297 0.203
Control variables include gender, age, wage, sick weeks until application, year dummies, medical conditions, contract types and firm size.
Claimants are excluded when their assigned case manager treated fewer than 25 claimants in the same year as the claimant.






































*** indicates significance at 1%.
nces in the effects. The probability to return to work increases
ith 38.0 percentage point compared to 12.7 percentage point and
he number of weeks worked increases with 8.9 weeks compared
o 1.2. One explanation for this difference in outcomes may  be that
raded return-to-work trajectories are more effective when started
arlier anyway, but there may  also be lock-in effects for trajectories
hat occur in the first weeks of grading. If the latter holds, we would
xpect differences in effectiveness of graded work to fade out over
ime. This is confirmed when comparing the long-term effects that
re shown in columns 2 and 6.16
The effect of graded return-to-work spells started in the first
alf year on weeks worked in the first year is comparable to the
ffect found in Markussen et al. (2012) with data from sick-listed
orkers in Norway. They find that part-time sick leave decreases
he absence spells with eight to ten weeks. Rehwald et al. (2018)
nd substantially bigger results, amounting to a 30 week increase
n weeks in regular employment in the first year.17 Contrary to
ur results, both Markussen et al. (2012) and Rehwald et al. (2018)
nd positive long run effects. The first shows that employment two
ears after sick listing increases with 16–21 percentage point, the
atter finds a increase of 27 weeks worked during the second year
nd an increase of 26 weeks in the third year. When comparing
hese outcomes with ours, one should bear in mind that employers
n the Netherlands are committed to facilitate the return-to-work
or the sick-listed workers for at least two years. As pointed out
16 To illustrate the evolution of the effects in more detail, Fig. A4 in Appendix B
hows the effects of graded return-to-work trajectories that started in the first half
ear on the return to work probability and on the number of weeks worked. The
ffect on the return-to-work probabilities is increasing up to week 46, after which
he effect declines. It appears that graded return-to-work speeds up the recovery
rocess, with the return-to-work probabilities being almost equal after 2 years. In
ine with this, the steep increase in weeks worked between weeks 40 and 60 does
ot  persist, such that the line flattens out towards the end of the second year.
17 Markussen et al. (2012) only consider grading decisions made within the first
ight weeks of sick leave. In the field experiment of Rehwald et al. (2018), graded
eturn-to-work should be started within four weeks after a meeting which is held
n  the first eight weeks.in Section 3, we  may  expect that individuals in the control group
– i.e., those without graded return-to-work – are likely to receive
other services. This in turn may  explain why  the long-term impacts
we find are smaller and insignificant. Still, our evidence also sug-
gests that graded return-to-work speeds up the recovery process,
particularly when starting early.
5.2. The effect of the starting degree of grading
We next investigate whether graded-work work trajectories
should be implemented at a high or low degree of grading. To this
end, Table 5 shows the main estimation results of the effect of the
initial degree of grading on work resumption and weeks worked
for trajectories starting in the first year of sick-listing. Table A5 in
Appendix B presents all underlying coefficient estimates.
Table 5 shows that being assigned to a case manager that tends
to start trajectories at high rates rather than to one that tends to
start at low rates, increases the starting level of work resumption
by about 22 percentage point. This effect roughly corresponds to an
increase of one day per working week. From the second stage esti-
mates we infer that a 10 percentage point higher level of grading
results in a 7 percentage point higher chance of recovering in the
first year and of 5 percentage point after 2 years.18 The number of
weeks worked in the first year increases by 1.3, whereas individu-
als work 4.1 additional weeks in the first two years. These findings
suggest that a higher initial level of grading improves both short-
term and long-term recovery rates. It appears that the potentially
positive effects of graded work cannot be established if the individ-
ual cannot properly participate in work processes and is not viewed
as a full-fledged employee.Table 6 presents the estimation results for models that include
both endogenous regressors and both grading propensities as
instruments. For ease of interpretation, we  re-specify the propen-
18 Note that more than 90% of the trajectories have an initial degree of graded work
that is less than 60%. The variation in the degrees we study thus typically reflects
differences between one, two or three days of working at the start of graded work.
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Table 6
Effects of the frequency and the starting degree of graded return-to-work on full work resumption.
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years Week 1–52 Week 1–104
(a) OLS estimates
Graded return-to-work 0.081*** 0.288*** −3.793*** 8.824***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.409) (1.006)
Starting level (0–100) 0.003*** 0.0004 0.112*** 0.171***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.019)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.206 0.181 0.309 0.250
(b)  IV estimates
Graded return-to-work −0.171 −0.162 −6.274 −13.24
(0.202) (0.188) (5.800) (14.14)
Starting level (0-100) 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.254*** 0.677***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.096) (0.233)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.154 0.065 0.282 0.195
Stage  1 estimates: graded return-to-work
g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.269*** (0.042)
so
i
(propensity starting level – orthogonal) 0.448*** (0.053)
Stage 1 estimates: starting level
g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 7.825*** (1.848)
so
i
(propensity starting level – orthogonal) 35.74*** (1.955)
(c)  Reduced form estimates of propensities
g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.034 (0.036) 0.020 (0.033) 0.299 (0.983) 1.741 (2.498)
so
i
(propensity starting level – orthogonal) 0.286*** (0.052) 0.216*** (0.050) 6.249*** (1.565) 18.26*** (3.848)
N  11,741 11,741 11,741 11,741
R2 0.172 0.072 0.299 0.206
Control variables include gender, age, wage, sick weeks until application, year dummies, medical conditions, contract types and firm size.
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*** indicates significance at 1%.
ity of the initial degree of grading as orthogonal to the frequency
ropensity and again normalize the difference to values between
ero and one.19 The first stage coefficients of all propensities in
he table are significant. Moreover, both the Kleibergen–Paap F-
est and the Sanderson–Windmeijer F-test on weak instruments are
arge and have P-values equal to zero.20 So even though the propen-
ities for the frequency and level of grading are correlated, these
ests suggest that both the coefficients of the effect the frequency
nd the level of graded work are identified from the data.
Turning to the second stage estimates in Table 6, our findings
re generally in line with those obtained from models with single
ndogenous regressors. The effects of using of graded work remain
nsignificant and become smaller for all outcome measures, while
he effects of the initial degree of grading remain significant and
ecome more sizable. Based on our estimates, the graded work tra-
ectories should be at least have starting levels between 15% and
5% to improve the likelihood to work resumption or to increase
he number of weeks that are worked. The effects on return to work
ates also indicate that the effects of graded work persist beyond
he absence period of two years.19 That is, we regress the propensity for the initial degree of grading on the
ropensity of the frequency of grading and use the (normalized) error terms of this
egression as a second propensity. Accordingly, the first stage and reduced form
stimates can be interpreted as the isolated effect of the propensities.
20 The Kleibergen–Paap F-test for two instruments and two endogenous regressors
quals 31.2, whereas the F-tests on the excluded instruments by Sanderson and
indmeijer equal 70.0 and 90.2.5.3. Effects for different types of medical conditions
Table 7 presents IV estimates for samples of specific medical
conditions that are registered by the reintegration provider. Panel
(a) shows the baseline estimates for all graded return-to-work
trajectories and panel (b) those for all graded return-to-work
trajectories started in the first 26 weeks. Panel (c) shows the
effects of the initial degree of grading.21 The first stage estimation
results are all similar in size across medical conditions, suggesting
that the extent to which case managers can affect the use and
degree of graded work is equal across groups. The second stage
estimates however vary across medical conditions. While graded
return-to-work increases first year return-to-work probabilities
substantially for general medical as well as musculo-skeletal
problems, it seems to have little effect on workers with mental
problems. This corresponds with the findings of Høgelund et al.
(2010) and Andren (2014) who  both find no effects of graded
return-to-work for individuals with mental disorders, but positive
effects for individuals with other disorders. Also Hernæs (2017)
finds larger effects for individuals with musculo-skeletal problems
than for individuals with psychological problems. A possible
explanation for this is that psychological problems are more often
related to the specific work environment, so that graded return-to-
work implies returning to the source of the problems rather than
21 The results for weeks worked correspond to the results for the return-to-work
probability and can be found in Table A6 of Appendix B.
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Table  7
IV estimation results of graded return-to-work and starting degree of grading on full work resumption for different medical conditions.
General medical Musculo-skeletal Mental
Returned to work Returned to work Returned to work
1  year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years
(a) Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–52
Graded return-to-work 0.572* 0.563** 0.477 −0.203 −0.023 −0.108
(0.327) (0.244) (0.540) (0.413) (0.352) (0.373)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.191*** 0.155 0.170**
(0.072) (0.095) (0.074)
(b)  Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–26
Graded return-to-work 0.789*** 0.468** 0.539* −0.061 0.051 −0.259
(0.238) (0.205) (0.323) (0.261) (0.261) (0.296)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.281*** 0.229*** 0.266***
(0.066) (0.076) (0.079)
(c)  Initial degree of grading
Starting level (0–100) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Stage  1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 34.68*** 31.27*** 33.40***
(1.436) (2.481) (2.581)
The group ‘general medical’ consists of individuals with the conditions general medical - mild/medium/severe. The group musculo-skeletal consists of individual with the
conditions neck, shoulder, arm, hip, ankle, knee or back complaints. The group mental consists of individuals with the conditions psychiatric, psychological – mild/severe,
psychosocial – mild/severe or social problems. Individuals with physical mild/severe conditions are not considered because of the small sample size. Also individuals labels
as  ‘other’ or having a conflict are excluded.
Control variables include gender, age, wage, sick weeks until application, year dummies, medical conditions, contract types and firm size.
































he  results are based on 3971 observations with general medical conditions, 1947 w
lustered (case manager–year) standard errors between parentheses.
/**/*** indicate significance levels of 10/5/1%, respectively.
ffering a solution to the problem.22 After two years of sickness,
he effect for individuals with musculo-skeletal problems tends
o zero, whereas the effect for individuals with general medical
roblems remains high. This indicates that graded work can be
eaningful for individuals with chronic illnesses or individuals
hat recover from medical treatments. Finally, we find that starting
t a higher initial level of graded work resumption results in higher
robabilities to return to work for all medical conditions and with
omparable coefficient magnitudes.
.4. Sensitivity tests: specialization and case manager quality
We  stated earlier that new clients were assigned to case man-
gers based only on their caseload. As a result, there would be no
pecialization of case managers that results in a positive correla-
ion between the propensity to grade and the likelihood to return
o work for reasons other than graded return-to-work itself. To ana-
yze the robustness of our findings to this assumption, we run a set
f sensitivity analyses which are reported in Table A11 of Appendix
. First, we re-run the regressions while excluding specific sets of
ovariates. That is, we exclude sick types in column (2), sick weeks
ntil application in column (3), and all covariates expect time dum-
ies in column (4). We  next exclude case managers with abnormal
lient group compositions from our sample, which gives the results
hown in columns (5) and (6). To this end, we define a group com-
osition to be abnormal if the group average of the characteristics of
he clients per case manager-year combination is more than three
column 4) or two (column 5) standard deviations away from the
verall mean. For both tests, the overall results for both graded
22 This mechanism may  also explain why  employment rates of individuals with
ental conditions are usually substantially lower than those of individuals with
ther conditions (OECD, 2010).usculo-skeletal conditions, and 3380 with conditions related to mental health.
work and the initial level of work resumption are similar to the
baseline.23
We also conduct sensitivity tests that consider the importance of
the overall case manager’s quality. For the validity of our approach,
case managers’ propensity to grade should not be correlated with
overall case manager quality. This exclusion restriction may  not
hold when, for example, high quality case managers are also more
likely to use graded work arrangements. We  therefore extend our
baseline models with two proxies for case manager quality – see
columns (2) and (3) of Table A12. The first proxy is the lagged
‘propensity to cure’, which measures the return to work rate of
a particular case manager in the previous year. The second proxy
for the quality of case managers is derived from the group of sick-
listed workers that already participated in graded work trajectories
before entering case management and therefore were excluded
from the sample. Knowing that the graded work status is given
for these observations, we calculate the case managers’ propensity
to cure for this auxiliary sample for each case manager–year com-
bination with at least ten observations. The general picture that
emerges is that the inclusion of the two proxies of case manager
quality are indeed positively correlated with work resumption, but
second stage estimates are close to those for the baseline models.23 It is important to stress that sick type is the only variable that is determined
by  the case manager after the client is assigned to him. Additional regressions on
propensities reveal that case managers with workers with less severe conditions
more often apply graded work, and/or that case managers who  tend to label some-
one’s illness as mild also tend to find graded return-to-work more often appropriate.
A  similar explanation may also hold for the change in the effect estimate of the initial
degree of grading that occurs when we exclude sick type dummies. In all cases, the
sizes of the difference in point estimates do not lead to concerns about the validity
of  our approach.





































Additional case manager characteristics.
Average working hours per year
– Less than 800 33.8%
–  800–1000 20.6%
–  More than 1000 26.5%
–  Unknown 19.1%
Senior reintegration specialist 7.4%
Education




– Less than 10 courses 16.2%
–  10–19 courses 44.1%
–  20–29 courses 26.5%
Fig. A1. Histogram of application moments of newly assigned sick-listed workers.00 L. Kools, P. Koning / Journal of H
. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the conditions under which graded
eturn-to-work arrangements are most effective at rehabilitating
ick-listed employees. We  use administrative data from a Dutch
rivate rehabilitation provider and exploit the differences in grad-
ng practices between case managers to identify the effect of graded
eturn-to-work. Our analysis relies on the fact that the assignment
f new sick-listed clients to case managers is based on caseload.
ased on this assumption, we effectively compare the full work
esumption rates of case managers with a high propensity to grade
o those with a low propensity to grade. We  extend this method by
lso constructing a propensity for the starting level of graded work.
We find that graded return-to-work has the potential to speed
p the recovery process, but does not does not necessarily help
ehabilitate individuals who would otherwise have not rehabili-
ated. Graded work that is initiated in the first 26 weeks of absence
ields an increase in the number of weeks worked during the first
wo years after sick-listing of 18 weeks, but has no significant
ffects on the probability to return to work within two  years. These
ndings may  stem from the fact that employers in the Netherlands
re committed to facilitate return-to-work for all sick-listed work-
rs.
Our evidence also suggests that the initial level of graded work
s a crucial determinant of the success of trajectories. Starting a
raded return-to-work trajectory at a work resumption rate which
s 10 percentage point higher increases the probability to return to
ork within two years with 5 percentage point. This indicates that
he potential positive effects of graded work can only be established
f the individual can properly participate in the work process. These
ffects are permanent, meaning that they affect the likelihood to
esume work also after the waiting period of two  years.
ppendix A. Additional data descriptives
Tables A1 and A2
able A1
election steps in data of the workplace reintegration provider.
Selection step Number of
observations
Total number of clients 35,040
Selection on contract type and insurera −14,156
Individual died or left because of problems with
insurance
−139
No case management/ goal other than back to work −2093
Intervention/graded rtw took place before application −5030
Implausible dates −121
Individual could not have been observed for two  years
at  October 7, 2016
−5
Year 2009–2010 deleted (only few observations) −221
Observations left 13,275
Individuals excluded due to missing values or being
assigned to case managers with less than 25 clients
that year
−1534-1,534
Observations used for analysis 11,741
a Different contract types follow different processes leading onto application at
he  workplace reintegration provider. The selected contract types follow similar
rocedures. The main criterion for selection was that the individuals should not have
een in contact with the workplace reintegration provider before the application
ate.-  30–39 courses 10.3%
-  40 or more courses 1.5%
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ppendix B. Additional estimation results
Tables A3–A12
able A3
ffect of graded return-to-work on full work resumption when started in week 1-52, including coefficients on control variables.
(a) Stage 0–dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
Sex 0.000 (0.001) Condition Contract type
Age  at application 0.001*** (0.000) General medical – medium 0.010*** (0.001) B 0.001 (0.002)
Age  at application2 0.000*** (0.000) General medical – severe 0.000 (0.001) C 0.003 (0.002)
ln(gross wage) 0.005*** (0.001) Neck, shoulder, arm 0.007*** (0.001) D 0.001 (0.002)
ln(gross wage)2 0.000*** (0.000) Physical – mild 0.008*** (0.001) E 0.003** (0.002)
Sick  weeks until application 0.001*** (0.0001) Physical – severe 0.004** (0.002) F 0.008*** (0.002)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) Hip, ankle, knee complaints 0.012*** (0.002) G 0.003 (0.002)
Application year Other −0.011*** (0.002) H 0.004** (0.002)
2012  −0.001 (0.002) Psychiatric −0.002 (0.002) I 0.004** (0.002)
2013  0.001 (0.002) Psychological – mild 0.004*** (0.001) Firm size
2014  0.002 (0.003) Psychological – severe −0.002 (0.002) 2–9 employee 0.001* (0.001)
Constant −0.016 (0.088) Psychosocial – mild 0.006*** (0.001) 10–49 employees 0.004*** (0.001)
Psychosocial – severe 0.005* (0.002) 50 or more employees 0.010*** (0.002)
Back  complaints 0.007*** (0.001) Unknown 0.001 (0.001)
Observations 290,929 social problems 0.008*** (0.002)
R-squared 0.011 Conflict −0.012*** (0.002)
(b)  Stage 1–dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
 g
i
(prop. graded rtw) 0.270*** (0.027) Condition Contract type
Sex  0.002 (0.009) General medical – medium 0.200*** (0.024) B 0.027 (0.027)
Age  at application 0.013*** (0.003) General medical – severe 0.107*** (0.024) C 0.049* (0.027)
Age  at application2 0.000*** (0.000) Neck, shoulder, arm 0.193*** (0.024) D 0.035 (0.025)
ln(gross wage) 0.102*** (0.018) Physical – mild 0.166*** (0.025) E 0.059** (0.026)
ln(gross wage)2 −0.006*** (0.002) Physical – severe 0.159*** (0.032) F 0.115*** (0.035)
Sick  weeks until application 0.000 (0.002) Hip, ankle, knee complaints 0.236*** (0.026) G 0.039 (0.040)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000*** (0.000) Other −0.254*** (0.039) H 0.070*** (0.026)
Application year Psychiatric 0.046 (0.039) I 0.066** (0.031)
2012  −0.048*** (0.012) Psychological – mild 0.148*** (0.022) Firm size
2013  −0.063*** (0.012) Psychological – severe 0.078** (0.031) 2–9 employees 0.021 (0.015)
2014  −0.070*** (0.013) Psychosocial – mild 0.163*** (0.024) 10–49 employees 0.060*** (0.014)
Constant −0.311*** (0.076) Psychosocial – severe 0.211*** (0.037) 50 or more employees 0.129*** (0.028)
Back  complaints 0.181*** (0.023) Unknown 0.007 (0.018)
Observations 11,741 Social problems 0.152*** (0.038)
Conflict −0.300*** (0.027)
(c)  Stage 2–dependent: returned to work within 1 year
Intervention 0.127 (0.122) Condition Contract type
Sex  −0.031*** (0.009) General medical – medium −0.169*** (0.030) B 0.047* (0.025)
Age  at application 0.0003 (0.003) General medical – severe −0.531*** (0.024) C 0.042 (0.027)
Age  at application2 0.000 (0.000) Neck, shoulder, arm −0.271*** (0.032) D −0.018 (0.028)
ln(gross wage) 0.017 (0.020) Physical – mild −0.100*** (0.028) E −0.002 (0.027)
ln(gross wage)2 −0.003* (0.002) Physical – severe −0.446*** (0.035) F 0.030 (0.037)
Sick  weeks until application −0.010*** (0.002) Hip, ankle, knee complaints −0.197*** (0.036) G 0.034 (0.035)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) Other −0.439*** (0.066) H −0.023 (0.027)
Application year Psychiatric −0.478*** (0.037) I 0.027 (0.031)
2012  0.171*** (0.017) Psychological – mild −0.319*** (0.029) Firm size
2013  0.181*** (0.020) Psychological – severe −0.510*** (0.035) 2–9 employees 0.012 (0.014)
2014  0.149*** (0.021) Psychosocial – mild −0.170*** (0.026) 10–49 employees 0.017 (0.016)
Constant 0.713*** (0.076) Psychosocial – severe −0.416*** (0.045) 50 or more employees 0.054 (0.035)
Back  complaints −0.274*** (0.030) unknown 0.017 (0.019)
Observations 11,741 social problems −0.073** (0.032)
R-squared 0.195 Conflict −0.108** (0.047)
a) Baseline category: general medical light.
b) Baseline category: 0–2 week.
c) Baseline category: 2011.
luster robust standard errors in parentheses.
uration baseline coefficients for stage-two estimates are shown in FigA2, propensities to treat before scaling are shown in Fig. A3.
/**/*** indicate significance levels of 10/5/1%, respectively.
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Fig. A2. Duration baseline coefficients for the effect of graded return-to-work starting in weeks 1–52 (Table A3), graded return-to-work starting in weeks 1–26 (Table A4)
and  the starting degree of grading (Table A5).
Fig. A3. Propensities to treat before scaling, obtained from models for the effect of graded return-to-work starting in weeks 1–52 (Table A3), graded return-to-work starting
in  weeks 1–26 (Table A4) and the starting degree of grading (Table A5).
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Table  A4
Effect of graded return-to-work on full work resumption when started in week 1–26, including coefficients on control variables.
(a) Stage 0–dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
Sex −0.001 (0.001) Condition Contract type
Age  at application 0.001*** (0.000) General medical – medium 0.006*** (0.002) B 0.003 (0.003)
Age  at application2 0.000*** (0.000) General medical – severe −0.017*** (0.002) C 0.005* (0.003)
ln(gross wage) 0.008*** (0.002) Neck, shoulder, arm complaints 0.001 (0.003) D 0.002 (0.003)
ln(gross wage)2 0.000*** (0.000) Physical – mild 0.008*** (0.003) E 0.006** (0.003)
Sick  weeks until application 0.001** (0.000) Physical – severe −0.009*** (0.003) F 0.011*** (0.004)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) Hip, ankle, knee complaints 0.007** (0.003) G 0.007* (0.004)
Application year Other −0.027*** (0.004) H 0.006* (0.003)
2012  −0.003 (0.004) Psychiatric −0.020*** (0.004) I 0.008** (0.003)
2013  0.000 (0.005) Psychological – mild −0.005** (0.002) Firm size
2014 0.002 (0.007) Psychological – severe −0.017*** (0.003) 2–9 employee 0.002 (0.001)
Constant −0.014 (0.106) Psychosocial – mild 0.001 (0.002) 10–49 employees 0.006*** (0.001)
Psychosocial – severe −0.013*** (0.004) 50 or more employees 0.014*** (0.003)
Back complaints 0.000 (0.003) Unknown 0.003 (0.002)
Observations 147,713 Social problems 0.009** (0.004)
R-squared 0.007 Conflict −0.028*** (0.003)
(b)  Stage 1–dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
 g
i
(prop. graded rtw) 0.268*** (0.027) Condition Contract type
Sex  −0.009 (0.009) General medical – medium 0.088*** (0.025) B 0.038 (0.028)
Age  at application 0.007** (0.003) General medical – severe −0.114*** (0.024) C 0.065** (0.029)
Age  at application2 0.000*** (0.000) Neck, shoulder, arm complaints 0.059** (0.024) D 0.035 (0.028)
ln(gross wage) 0.078*** (0.017) Physical – mild 0.104*** (0.027) E 0.065** (0.030)
ln(gross wage)2 −0.005*** (0.002) Physical – severe −0.037 (0.032) F 0.085** (0.034)
Sick  weeks until application −0.016*** (0.002) Hip, ankle, knee complaints 0.096*** (0.027) G 0.069* (0.039)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) Other −0.269*** (0.037) H 0.063** (0.028)
Application year Psychiatric −0.163*** (0.036) I 0.069** (0.032)
2012  −0.038*** (0.010) Psychological – mild 0.004 (0.023) Firm size
2013 −0.033*** (0.011) Psychological – severe −0.113*** (0.030) 2–9 employee 0.015 (0.014)
2014  −0.052*** (0.012) Psychosocial – mild 0.053** (0.024) 10–49 employees 0.048*** (0.013)
Constant −0.005 (0.072) Psychosocial – severe −0.066 (0.041) 50 or more employees 0.124*** (0.029)
Back complaints 0.048** (0.024) Unknown 0.022 (0.018)
Observations 11,741 Social problems 0.103** (0.040)
Conflict −0.347*** (0.027)
(c)  Stage 2–dependent: returned to work within 1 year
Intervention 0.380*** (0.125) Condition Contract type
Sex  −0.027*** (0.009) General medical – medium −0.176*** (0.020) B 0.036 (0.026)
Age  at application −0.001 (0.003) General medical – severe −0.473*** (0.024) C 0.023 (0.028)
Age  at application2 0.000 (0.000) Neck, shoulder, arm complaints −0.267*** (0.022) D −0.028 (0.028)
ln(gross wage) −0.001 (0.020) Physical – mild −0.117*** (0.024) E −0.020 (0.028)
ln(gross wage)2 −0.002 (0.002) Physical – severe −0.411*** (0.026) F 0.011 (0.035)
Sick  weeks until application −0.004 (0.003) Hip, ankle, knee complaints −0.203*** (0.025) G 0.011 (0.035)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) Other −0.370*** (0.064) H −0.039 (0.027)
Application year Psychiatric −0.408*** (0.039) I 0.008 (0.032)
2012  0.179*** (0.017) Psychological – mild −0.301*** (0.021) Firm size: Firm size
2013  0.186*** (0.018) Psychological – severe −0.455*** (0.034) 2–10 employees 0.008 (0.014)
2014  0.160*** (0.019) Psychosocial – mild −0.168*** (0.020) 10–49 employees 0.006 (0.016)
Constant 0.634*** (0.073) Psychosocial – severe −0.362*** (0.035) 50 or more employees 0.022 (0.035)
Back complaints −0.268*** (0.021) Unknown 0.010 (0.018)
Observations 11,741 Social problems −0.090*** (0.026)
R-squared 0.230 Conflict −0.014 (0.053)
(a) Baseline category: general medical light.
(b) Baseline category: 0–2 week.
(c) Baseline category: 2011.
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Duration baseline coefficients for stage-two estimates are shown in Fig. A2, propensities to treat before scaling are shown in Fig. A3.
*/**/*** indicate significance levels of 10/5/1%, respectively.
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Table A5
Effect of initial degree of graded return-to-work on full work resumption, including coefficients on control variables.
(a) Stage 0–dependent: starting level (0–100)
Sex −0.042* (0.025) Condition Contract type
Age  at application 0.027*** (0.007) General medical – medium 0.249*** (0.053) B 0.022 (0.068)
Age  at application2 0.000*** (0.000) General medical – severe −0.223*** (0.053) C 0.081 (0.072)
ln(gross wage) 0.173*** (0.039) Neck, shoulder, arm complaints 0.111* (0.062) D −0.011 (0.070)
ln(gross wage)2 −0.012*** (0.004) Physical – mild 0.234*** (0.061) E 0.072 (0.069)
Sick  weeks until application 0.023*** (0.006) Physical – severe −0.122* (0.073) F 0.265*** (0.096)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) Hip, ankle, knee complaints 0.339*** (0.065) G 0.110 (0.102)
Application year Other −0.476*** (0.090) H 0.099 (0.073)
2012  0.022 (0.072) Psychiatric −0.300*** (0.090) I 0.165** (0.081)
2013  0.153 (0.099) Psychological – mild −0.116** (0.054) Firm size
2014  0.181 (0.126) Psychological – severe −0.280*** (0.077) 2–9 employee 0.078** (0.035)
Constant −0.016 (0.088) Psychosocial – mild 0.031 (0.055) 10–49 employees 0.181*** (0.035)
Psychosocial – severe −0.060 (0.096) 50 or more employees 0.397*** (0.082)
Back complaints 0.089 (0.061) Unknown 0.049 (0.046)
Observations 290,929 Social problems 0.250*** (0.094)
R-squared 0.009 Conflict −0.511*** (0.062)
(b)  Stage 1–dependent: starting level (0–100)
s
i
(prop. starting level) 22.50*** (0.613) Condition Contract type
Sex  −0.586 (0.433) General medical – medium 4.209*** (1.203) B 0.475 (1.289)
Age  at application 0.419*** (0.135) General medical – severe −2.103* (1.140) C 1.241 (1.351)
Age  at application2 −0.004*** (0.002) Neck, shoulder, arm complaints 3.149** (1.323) D −0.219 (1.275)
ln(gross wage) 2.932*** (0.781) Physical – mild 4.389*** (1.194) E 0.938 (1.292)
ln(gross wage)2 −0.212*** (0.077) Physical – severe −1.126 (1.312) F 4.005** (1.684)
Sick  weeks until application −0.091 (0.082) Hip, ankle, knee complaints 5.874*** (1.215) G 1.287 (1.851)
Sick  weeks until application2 −0.005*** (0.002) Other −11.40*** (1.888) H 1.284 (1.290)
Application year Psychiatric −4.759*** (1.686) I 2.569* (1.520)
2012  0.592* (0.311) Psychological - mild −1.247 (1.068) Firm size:
2013  0.307 (0.347) Psychological – severe −3.203** (1.470) 2–9 employee 1.577** (0.648)
2014  −1.334*** (0.379) Psychosocial – mild 1.221 (1.050) 10–49 employees 3.227*** (0.597)
Constant −8.696** (3.655) Psychosocial – severe 1.694 (2.012) 50 or more employees 5.548*** (1.285)
Back complaints 2.245* (1.205) Unknown 1.278 (0.873)
Observations 11,741 Social problems 4.109** (1.757)
conflict −12.56*** (1.319)
(c)  Stage 2–dependent: returned to work within 1 year
Starting level (0-100) 0.007*** (0.002) Condition Contract type
Sex  −0.025*** (0.009) General medical – medium −0.173*** (0.020) B 0.049** (0.024)
Age  at application −0.001 (0.003) General medical – severe −0.504*** (0.020) C 0.039 (0.026)
Age  at application2 0.000 (0.000) Neck, shoulder, arm complaints −0.269*** (0.023) D −0.012 (0.027)
ln(gross wage) 0.009 (0.016) Physical – mild −0.109*** (0.022) E 0.000 (0.027)
ln(gross wage)2 −0.002 (0.002) −Physical – severe −0.420*** (0.029) F 0.016 (0.034)
Sick  weeks until application −0.009*** (0.002) Hip, ankle, knee complaints −0.209*** (0.025) G 0.028 (0.034)
Sick  weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) Other −0.399*** (0.056) H −0.023 (0.026)
Application year Psychiatric −0.442*** (0.035) I 0.018 (0.031)
2012  0.161*** (0.017) Psychological - mild −0.292*** (0.022) Firm size
2013  0.171*** (0.019) Psychological – severe −0.479*** (0.033) 2–9 employees 0.004 (0.014)
2014  0.149*** (0.019) Psychosocial – mild −0.157*** (0.020) 10–49 employees 0.002 (0.015)
Constant 0.688*** (0.071) Psychosocial – severe −0.402*** (0.035) 50 or more employees 0.031 (0.034)
Back complaints −0.267*** (0.023) Unknown 0.011 (0.019)
Observations 11,741 Social problems −0.080*** (0.025)
R-squared 0.187 Conflict −0.061* (0.035)
(a) Baseline category: general medical light.
(b) Baseline category: 0–2 week.
(c) Baseline category: 2011.
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Duration baseline coefficients for stage-two estimates are shown in Fig. A2, propensities to treat before scaling are shown in Fig. A3.
*/**/*** indicate significance levels of 10/5/1%, respectively.
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Table  A6
IV estimation results for different medical conditions; effects on weeks worked.
General medical Musculo-skeletal Mental
Weeks worked in Weeks worked in Weeks worked in
Week 1–52 Week 1–104 Week 1–52 Week 1–104 Week 1–52 Week 1–104
(a) Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–52
Graded return-to-work 9.066 30.54 8.680 6.885 7.341 6.824
(9.855) (20.87) (17.21) (29.57) (10.85) (24.74)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.191*** 0.155 0.1703**
(0.072) (0.095) (0.074)
(b)  Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–26
Graded return-to-work 20.06*** 42.12*** 14.31 18.34 5.354 −0.427
(7.555) (15.51) (11.33) (21.25) (7.752) (19.92)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.281*** 0.229*** 0.266***
(0.066) (0.076) (0.079)
(c)  Initial degree of grading
Starting level (0–100) 0.157*** 0.486*** 0.199*** 0.485*** 0.139** 0.410***
(0.050) (0.111) (0.071) (0.148) (0.061) (0.142)
Stage  1: s
i
(prop. starting level) 34.68*** 31.27*** 33.40***
(1.436) (2.481) (2.581)
The group general medical consists of individuals with the conditions general medical – mild/medium/severe. The group musculo-skeletal consists of individual with the
conditions neck, shoulder, arm, hip, ankle, knee or back complaints. The group mental consists of individuals with the conditions psychiatric, psychological – mild/severe,
psychosocial – mild/severe or social problems. Individuals with physical mild/severe conditions are not considered because of the small sample size. Also individuals labels
as  ‘other’ or having a conflict are excluded.
Control variables include gender, age, wage, sick weeks until application, year dummies, medical conditions, contract types and firm size.
Claimants are excluded when their assigned case manager treated fewer than 10 claimants of the same type in the same year as the claimant.
The  results are based on 3971 observations with general medical conditions, 1947 with musculo-skeletal conditions, and 3380 with conditions related to mental health.
Clustered (case manager–year) standard errors in parentheses.
*/**/** indicate significance levels of 10/5/1%, respectively.
Table A7
IV estimation results for effects of graded work starting in first 52 weeks using different cut-offs for the minimum number of clients per case manager.
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years Week 1–52 Week 1–104
(a) 15 clients or more per caseworker (N = 12,534)
Graded return-to-work 0.093 0.086 −0.784 4.090
(0.117) (0.103) (3.489) (8.245)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.385***
(0.033)
(b) 20 clients or more per caseworker (N = 12,258)
Graded return-to-work 0.129 0.079 0.487 5.821
(0.115) (0.109) (3.375) (8.189)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.343***
(0.032)
(c) 25 clients or more per caseworker (N = 11,741)
Graded return-to-work 0.127 0.075 1.173 6.642
(0.122) (0.109) (3.581) (8.531)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.270***
(0.027)
(d) 30 clients or more per caseworker (N = 11,343)
Graded return-to-work 0.145 0.041 1.243 5.922
(0.121) (0.108) (3.626) (8.469)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.268***
(0.029)
(e) 35 clients or more per caseworker (N = 10,810)
Graded return-to-work 0.188 0.054 2.757 7.682
(0.124) (0.110) (3.683) (8.734)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.271***
(0.030)
Clustered (case manager–year) standard errors between parentheses.
*p<0.1.
**p<0.05
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A8
IV estimation results for effects of graded work starting in first 26 weeks using different cut-offs for the minimum number of clients per case manager.
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years Week 1–52 Week 1–104
(a) 15 clients or more per caseworker (N = 12,534)
Graded return-to-work 0.344*** 0.0736 7.605** 16.02**
(0.115) (0.100) (3.596) (8.113)
Stage 1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.386***
(0.034)
(b) 20 clients or more per caseworker (N = 12,258)
Graded return-to-work 0.348*** 0.061 7.331** 15.56*
(0.111) (0.103) (3.355) (7.945)
Stage 1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.386***
(0.035)
(c) 25 clients or more per caseworker (N = 11,741)
Graded return-to-work 0.380*** 0.070 8.901** 18.30**
(0.125) (0.104) (3.759) (8.624)
Stage 1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.268***
(0.027)
(d) 30 clients or more per caseworker (N = 11,343)
Graded return-to-work 0.337*** 0.031 7.803** 14.84*
(0.119) (0.103) (3.699) (8.227)
Stage 1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.268***
(0.028)
(e) 35 clients or more per caseworker (N = 10,810)
Graded return-to-work 0.335*** 0.0272 8.125** 13.99
(0.123) (0.109) (3.745) (8.520)
Stage 1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.244***
(0.026)
Clustered (case manager–year) standard errors between parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table A9
IV estimation results for the effect of starting degree grading using different cut-offs for the minimum number of clients per case manager.
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years Week 1–52 Week 1–104
(a) 15 clients or more per caseworker (N = 12, 534)
Starting level (0–100) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.141*** 0.447***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.047) (0.107)
Stage 1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 26.86***
(0.805)
(b)  20 clients or more per caseworker (N = 12, 258)
Starting level (0–100) 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.138*** 0.440***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.046) (0.108)
Stage 1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 22.61***
(0.638)
(c)  25 clients or more per caseworker (N = 11, 741)
Starting level (0–100) 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.132*** 0.421***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.049) (0.113)
Stage 1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 22.50***
(0.613)
(d)  30 clients or more per caseworker (N = 11, 343)
Starting level (0–100) 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.138*** 0.428***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.053) (0.122)
Stage 1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 18.24***
(0.528)
(e)  35 clients or more per caseworker (N = 10, 810)
Starting level (0–100) 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.144** 0.447***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.058) (0.134)
Stage 1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 17.60***
(0.561)
Clustered (case manager–year) standard errors between parentheses.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table  A10
IV first stage estimation results for graded work starting in first 52 weeks, stratified by subcategories of impairments.
Subgroup Overall: started in Initial degree of grading N
Week 1–52 Week 1–26
(a) Detailed subcategories
General medical – mild 0.174* 0.175 25.49*** 907
(0.104) (0.109) (6.163)
General medical – medium 0.343*** 0.334*** 25.24*** 1,588
(0.067) (0.067) (3.142)
General medical – severe 0.198*** 0.202*** 25.48*** 1,350
(0.075) (0.075) (4.243)
Physical – mild 0.177* 0.120 21.16*** 838
(0.093) (0.092) (4.748)
Physical – severe 0.488*** 0.495*** 35.83*** 427
(0.099) (0.101) (5.385)
Neck, shoulder, arm complaints 0.179 0.228* 23.61*** 810
(0.146) (0.127) (7.183)
Hip, ankle, knee complaints 0.318*** 0.391*** 23.89*** 743
(0.106) (0.105) (4.801)
Back complaints 0.081 0.036 25.89** 860
(0.232) (0.222) (10.44)
Psychiatric 0.043 0.082 −1.336 210
(0.196) (0.195) (7.142)
Psychological – mild 0.140* 0.172** 11.99*** 1,338
(0.077) (0.085) (3.349)
Psychological – severe 0.042 −0.116 8.468 328
(0.173) (0.162) (6.821)
Psychosocial – mild 0.370*** 0.288*** 23.67*** 1254
(0.084) (0.098) (3.415)
Psychosocial – severe 0.445*** −0.001 22.72** 209
(0.156) (0.169) (9.219)
Social problems 0.423*** 0.481*** 23.71*** 244
(0.096) (0.101) (5.001)
Conflict 0.228 0.440** 30.05*** 464
(0.197) (0.187) (10.28)
Othera 0.269** 0.247** 18.28*** 171
(0.110) (0.106) (6.950)
F-test on equality of coefficients
F(15, 181) 1.98 1.94 2.93
p-Value 0.0190 0.0220 0.0004
(b)  Rough subcategories
General medical 0.261*** 0.176 25.55*** 3,845
(0.049) (0.108) (2.003)
Musculo-skeletal 0.298*** 0.333*** 22.91*** 2,413
(0.060) (0.067) (2.391)
Mental 0.246*** 0.207*** 18.06*** 3,373
(0.048) (0.075) (1.984)
F-test on equality of coefficients
F(2, 181) 0.21 1.15 2.98
p-Value 0.8094 0.3186 0.0531
a ‘Other’ contains conditions such as flue and complaints due to pregnancy.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Fig. A4. Cumulative effects of graded return-to-work starting in weeks 1–52 on full work resumption and weeks worked, estimated by elapsed sick weeks.
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Table A11
Sensitivity tests for specialization effects for return-to-work within one year.
Dependent: Return-to-work within 1 year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Exclude covariates Exclude abnormal groups
Sick type Weeks until application All expect year dummies >3 sd from mean >2 sd from mean
(a) Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–52
Graded return-to-work 0.127 0.130 0.099 −0.027 0.253** 0.263
(0.122) (0.137) (0.124) (0.132) (0.118) (0.279)
Stage 1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.270*** 0.254*** 0.266*** 0.271*** 0.285*** 0.233***
−0.027 (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.032) (0.050)
(b)  Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–26
Graded return-to-work 0.380*** 0.477*** 0.370*** 0.391*** 0.331*** 0.340*
(0.125) (0.140) (0.121) (0.138) (0.093) (0.192)
Stage 1: g
i
(propensity graded rtw) 0.268*** 0.239*** 0.274*** 0.255*** 0.301*** 0.322***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.061)
(c)  Initial degree of grading
Starting level (0-100) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Stage 1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 22.50*** 21.70*** 23.07*** 21.62*** 21.76*** 20.15***
(0.613) (0.568) (0.688) (0.658) (0.687) (1.058)
Claimants are excluded when their assigned case manager treated fewer than 25 claimants in the same year as the claimant.
The  results are based upon 11,741 observations of which 8464 remain in column (5) and 3807 in column (6).
Clustered (case manager–year) standard errors between parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table A12
Sensitivity tests to the inclusion of proxies for case manager quality, with full return-to-work within one year as dependent variable.
Dep.t: Return-to-work within 1 year (1) (2) (3)
Baseline Propensity to cure
Lagged Graded at start
(a) Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–52




(propensity to cure) 0.202*** 0.143***
(0.071) (0.038)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded return-to-work) 0.270*** 0.267*** 0.268***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.027)
Stage  1: c
i
(propensity to cure) −0.091** −0.008
(0.037) (0.023)
(b)  Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1–26




(propensity to cure) 0.188*** 0.137***
(0.060) (0.035)
Stage  1: g
i
(propensity graded return-to-work) 0.268*** 0.284*** 0.257***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
Stage  1: c
i
(propensity to cure) −0.036 0.004
(0.034) (0.021)
(c)  Initial degree of grading




(propensity to cure) 0.184*** 0.125***
(0.062) (0.038)
Stage  1: s
i
(propensity starting level) 22.50*** 21.84*** 21.71***
(0.613) (0.770) (0.635)
Stage  1: c
i
(propensity to cure) 0.422 0.368
(1.272) (0.659)
Claimants are excluded when their assigned case managers treated fewer than 25 claimants that year.
The  results are based upon 11,741 observations of which 8319 remain in column (3) and 10,244 in column (4).
Baseline results under the sample of individuals included in column (3): (a) 0.180 (0.131), (b) 0.355*** (0.122), (c) 0.008*** (0.002). Baseline results under the sample of
individuals included in column (4): (a) 0.107 (0.138), (b) 0.360*** (0.139), (c) 0.007*** (0.002).
Clustered (case manager–year) standard errors between parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.

















early part-time sick leave due to musculoskeletal disorders: a randomized
controlled trial. Scand. J. Work Environ. Health 38, 134–143.
Wainwright, E., Wainwright, D., Keogh, E., Eccleston, C., 2011. Fit for purpose?
Using the fit note with patients with chronic pain: a qualitative study. Br. J.L. Kools, P. Koning / Journal of H
eferences
ndren, D., Svensson, M.,  2012. Part-time sick leave as a treatment method for
individuals with musculoskeletal disorders. J. Occup. Rehabil. 22, 418–426.
ndren, D., 2014. Does part-time sick leave help individuals with mental disorders
recover lost work capacity? J. Occup. Rehabil. 24, 344–360.
ernacki, E.J., Guidera, J.A., Schaefer, J.A., Tsai, S., 2000. A facilitated early return to
work program at a large urban medical center. J. Occup. Environ. Med. 42,
1172–1177.
ethge, M.,  2016. Effects of graded return-to-work: a propensity-score-matched
analysis. Scand. J. Work Environ. Health 42, 273–279.
e Jong, P., Lindeboom, M.,  van der Klaauw, B., 2011. Screening disability insurance
applications. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 9, 106–129.
e Jong, P., Gielen, M.,  Haanstra-Veldhuis, V., 2014. Verzekeringsgraad kleine
werkgevers – eindrapportage, Research commissioned by the Ministry of
Social Affairs.
ean, D., Pepper, J., Schmidt, R., Stern, S., 2015. The effects of vocational
rehabilitation for people with cognitive impairments. Int. Econ. Rev. 56,
399–426.
uggan, M.,  2005. Do new prescription drugs pay for themselves? The case of
second-generation antipsychotics. J. Health Econ. 24, 1–31.
verhardt, T.P., de Jong, P.R., 2011. Return to work after long term sickness. The
role of employer based interventions. Economist 159, 361–380.
rench, E., Song, J., 2014. The effect of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply.
Am.  Econ. J. Econ. Policy 6, 291–337.
øgelund, J., Holm, A., McIntosh, J., 2010. Does graded return-to-work improve
sick-listed workers’ chance of returning to regular working hours? J. Health
Econ. 29, 158–169.
øgelund, J., Holm, A., Eplov, L.F., 2012. The effect of part-time sick leave for
employees with mental disorders. J. Mental Health Policy Econ. 15, 157–170.ernæs, Ø., 2017. Activation against absenteeism: evidence from a sickness
insurance reform in Norway. In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10991.
austo, J., Miranda, H., Martimo, K.P., Viikari-Juntura, E., 2008. Partial sick leave –
review of its use, effects and feasibility in the Nordic countries. Scand. J. Work
Environ. Health 34, 239–249.Economics 65 (2019) 189–209 209
Kausto, J., Viikari-Juntura, E., Virta, L.J., Gould, R., Koskinen, A., Solovieva, S., 2014.
Effectiveness of new legislation on partial sickness benefit on work
participation: a quasi-experiment in Finland. BMJ  Open 4, e006685.
Koning, P., Lindeboom, M.,  2015. The rise and fall of disability insurance
enrollment in the Netherlands. J. Econ. Perspect. 29, 151–172.
Koning, P., 2017. Privatizing sick pay: does it work? IZA World Labor 324, 1–9.
Krause, N., Dasinger, L.K., Neuhauser, F., 1998. Modified work and return to work: a
review of the literature. J. Occup. Rehabil. 8, 113–139.
Maestas, N., Mullen, K.J., Strand, A., 2013. Does Disability Insurance receipt
discourage work? Using examiner assignment to estimate casual effects of
SSDI receipt. Am. Econ. Rev. 103, 1797–1829.
Markussen, S., Røed, K., 2014. The impacts of vocation rehabilitation. Labour Econ.
31, 1–13.
Markussen, S., Mykletun, A., Røed, K., 2012. The case for presenteeism – evidence
from Norway’s sickness insurance program. J. Public Econ. 96, 959–972.
Markussen, S., Røed, K., Schreiner, R.C., 2018. Can compulsory dialogues nudge
sick-listed workers back to work? Econ. J. 128 (610), 1276–1303, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/ecoj.12468.
OECD, 2010. Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers. A Synthesis of
Findings Across OECD Countries. OECD Publishing, Paris.
Rehwald, K., Rosholm, M.,  Roulande, B., 2018. Labour market effects of activating
sick-listed workers. Labour Econ. 53, 15–32.
van Sonsbeek, J.M., Gradus, R.H.J.M., 2013. Estimating the effects of recent
disability reforms in the Netherlands. Oxford Econ. Pap. 65, 832–855.
Viikari-Juntura, E., Kausto, J., Shiri, R., Kaila-Kangas, L., Pekka Takala, E., Karppinen,
J.,  Miranda, H., Luukkonen, R., Pekka Martimo, K., 2012. Return to work afterGen. Pract. 61, 794–800.
